In this paper, we investigate a distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem for a timevarying multi-agent network consisting of two subnetworks. We propose a subgradientbased distributed algorithm to seek a Nash equilibrium of a zero-sum game, where the two subnetworks share the same sum objective function. We show that the proposed distributed algorithm with homogenous stepsize can achieve a Nash equilibrium under uniformly jointly strongly connected (UJSC) weight-balanced digraphs. Then for weight-unbalanced graphs, we show, by considering a special case, that generally a Nash equilibrium cannot be achieved with homogenous stepsize unless certain conditions on the objective functions hold. Next we show that for any UJSC digraphs, there always exist stepsizes under which a Nash equilibrium can be achieved. Finally, for two general weight-unbalanced cases, we show that by adaptively updating the stepsize along with the arc weights in the proposed algorithm, a convergence to the Nash equilibrium can still be guaranteed.
Introduction
In recent years, distributed control and optimization of multi-agent systems have drawn much research attention. Research on multi-agent cooperation problems such as consensus, rendezvous, emerged in recent years. For example, an approximate saddle point problem with a constant stepsize was considered, and the corresponding per-iteration convergence rate was estimated in [24] . An algorithm based on two subnetworks, with one to minimize the objective function and the other to maximize it, was proposed in [40] , where a continuous-time set-valued dynamical system solution to seek a Nash equilibrium was first designed for undirected graphs and then for weight-balanced directed graphs by introducing a new system parameter. However, there are still few results obtained on distributed computation to reach a saddle-point Nash equilibrium under switching weight-unbalanced graphs.
In this paper, we consider the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem proposed in [40] , where a multi-agent network consisting of two subnetworks plays a zero-sum game. Each agent in the network has its own objective function, and the two subnetworks share the same sum objective function. When the two subnetworks are viewed as two (groups of) players, a zero-sum game is defined and the objective of the agents is to achieve a Nash equilibrium via distributed computation based on local information. In fact, the agents in the two different subnetworks play antagonistic roles against each other, while the agents in the same subnetwork behave cooperatively. The contribution of this paper is summarized as follows.
• We propose a subgradient-based distributed algorithm for a multi-agent network to seek a saddle-point Nash equilibrium under time-varying topologies. We show that our proposed algorithm with homogeneous stepsizes can achieve a saddle-point Nash equilibrium under uniformly jointly strongly connected (UJSC) weight-balanced digraphs.
• Most results on distributed optimization were obtained for weight-balanced graphs, but the weight-balanced condition is quite restrictive and may not be easy to verify in a distributed setup. In weight-unbalanced cases, existing distributed homogeneous-stepsize algorithms may fail. In fact, we show that even for the completely identical subnetworks case, the proposed algorithm with homogeneous stepsizes converges, but may not converge to the desired Nash equilibrium unless the saddle point sets of all the objective functions are the same.
• To solve the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problems in general weight-unbalanced cases, we propose a heterogeneous stepsize rule and study its possibility to cooperatively seek the desired Nash equilibrium. We first show that for any UJSC time-varying digraphs, there always exist (heterogeneous) stepsizes to make the network achieve a Nash equilibrium. Then we construct an adaptive algorithm to update the stepsizes in two standard cases: the cases with a common eigenvector and with periodically switching topologies, to ensure the convergence to a saddle-point Nash equilibrium under time-varying digraphs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives some basic concepts and preliminary results. Then Section 3 formulates the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem and proposes a distributed algorithm for it. Section 4 gives conditions to achieve a saddle-point Nash equilibrium in the weight-balanced digraph case. Section 5 discusses the limitations of homogeneous stepsize algorithms by considering a special case of the proposed algorithm, while Section 6 presents results for weight-unbalanced digraphs. Following that, Section 7 provides numerical simulations for illustration. Finally, some concluding remarks are given in Section 8.
Notations: | · | denotes the Euclidean norm; ·, · denotes the Euclidean inner product; B(z, ε) {y||y − z| ≤ ε} denotes a ball with z as the center and ε > 0 as the radius; z T denotes the transpose of vector z; 1 = (1, ..., 1) T of appropriate dimension; A ij denotes the i-th row and j-th column entry of matrix A; S + n = {ω|ω i > 0, n i=1 ω i = 1} denotes the set of all n-dimensional positive unit stochastic vectors with ℓ 1 -norm; diag{c 1 · · · c n } denotes the diagonal matrix with diagonal elements c 1 , ..., c n .
Preliminaries
In this section, we give preliminaries on graph theory [5] , convex analysis [6] , Nash equilibrium [2] , and sequence convergence.
Graph Theory
A multi-agent network consisting ofn agents can be described by a digraph (directed graph)Ḡ = (V,Ē) formed by node setV = {1, ...,n} and arc setĒ ⊆V ×V. Associated with graphḠ, there is a (weighted) adjacency matrixĀ = (ā ij ) ∈ Rn ×n with nonnegative adjacency elementsā ij , which is positive if and only if (j, i) ∈Ē. Node j is a neighbor of node i if (j, i) ∈Ē. Assume (i, i) ∈Ē for i = 1, ...,n. A path inḠ from i 1 to i p is an alternating sequence i 1 e 1 i 2 e 2 · · · i p−1 e p−1 i p of nodes i r , 1 ≤ r ≤ p and arcs e r = (i r , i r+1 ) ∈Ē, 1 ≤ r ≤ p − 1. GraphḠ is said to be bipartite if V can be partitioned into two disjoint partsV 1 andV 2 such thatĒ ⊆ 2 ℓ=1 (V ℓ ×V 3−ℓ ). Consider a multi-agent network Ξ consisting of two subnetworks Ξ 1 and Ξ 2 with respective n 1 and n 2 agents. Ξ is described by a digraph, denoted as G = (V, E), which contains selfloops, i.e., (i, i) ∈ E for each i. Here G can be partitioned into three digraphs: G ℓ = (V ℓ , E ℓ ) with V ℓ = {ω ℓ 1 , ..., ω ℓ n ℓ }, ℓ = 1, 2, and a bipartite graph G ⊲⊳ = (V, E ⊲⊳ ), where V = V 1 V 2 and E = E 1 E 2 E ⊲⊳ . That is to say, Ξ 1 and Ξ 2 are described by the two digraphs, G 1 and G 2 , respectively, and the interconnection between Ξ 1 and Ξ 2 is described by G ⊲⊳ . Here graph G ⊲⊳ is called bipartite without isolated nodes if, for any i ∈ V ℓ , there is at least one node j ∈ V 3−ℓ such that (j, i) ∈ E for ℓ = 1, 2. Let A ℓ denote the adjacency matrix of G ℓ , ℓ = 1, 2. Digraph G ℓ is said to be strongly connected if there is a path in G ℓ from i to j for any pair node i, j ∈ V ℓ . A node is said to be a root node if there is at least a path from this node to any other node. In the sequel, we will write i ∈ V ℓ instead of ω ℓ i ∈ V ℓ , ℓ = 1, 2 for simplicity if there is no confusion. Digraph G ℓ is said to be weight-balanced if j∈V ℓ a ij = j∈V ℓ a ji for i ∈ V ℓ ; and it is weight-unbalanced otherwise.
A vector is said to be stochastic if all its components are nonnegative and the sum of its components is one. A matrix is a stochastic matrix if its each row vector is stochastic. A stochastic vector is positive if all its components are positive.
Let B = (b ij ) ∈ R n×n be a stochastic matrix. Define G B = {1, ..., n}, E B as the graph associated with B, where (j, i) ∈ E B if and only if b ij > 0 (its adjacency matrix is B). According to Perron-Frobenius theorem [1] , there is a unique positive stochastic left eigenvector of B associated with eigenvalue one if G B is strongly connected. We call this eigenvector the Perron vector of B. The following lemma shows that the converse in some sense is also true, whose proof is in Appendix.
Lemma 2.1 For any
n , there is a stochastic matrix B = (b ij ) ∈ R n×n such that G B is strongly connected and µ T B = µ T .
Convex Analysis
A set K ⊆ R m is said to be convex if λz 1 + (1 − λ)z 2 ∈ K for any z 1 , z 2 ∈ K and 0 < λ < 1.
A point z is said to be an interior point of K if B(z, ε) ⊆ K for some ε > 0. For a closed convex set K in R m , we can associate with any z ∈ R m a unique element P K (z) ∈ K satisfying |z − P K (z)| = inf y∈K |z − y| (denoted as |z| K ), where P K is the projection operator onto K.
We have the following lemma for the projection operator P K . Lemma 2.2 Let K 0 ⊆ K be two closed convex sets in R m . Then (i) |P K (y) − P K (z)| ≤ |y − z| for any y and z;
(ii) |P K (y) − z| ≤ |y − z| for any y ∈ R m and any z ∈ K.
Clearly, (i) is the non-expansiveness property; (ii) comes from Lemma 1 (b) in [30] .
for any z 1 = z 2 ∈ R m and 0 < λ < 1. A function ϕ is said to be (strictly) concave if −ϕ is (strictly) convex. A convex function ϕ : R m → R is continuous.
For a convex function ϕ, v(ẑ) ∈ R m is a subgradient of ϕ at pointẑ if
The set of all subgradients of (convex or concave) function ϕ atẑ is denoted by ∂ϕ(ẑ), which is called the subdifferential of ϕ atẑ.
Saddle Point and Nash Equilibrium
Function φ(·, ·) : R m 1 × R m 2 → R is said to be (strictly) convex-concave if it is (strictly) convex for first argument and (strictly) concave for second argument. Given a point (x,ŷ), we denote by ∂ x φ(x,ŷ) the subdifferential of convex function φ(·,ŷ) atx and ∂ y φ(x,ŷ) the subdifferential of concave function φ(x, ·) atŷ.
The next lemma presents a necessary and sufficient condition of characterizing the saddle point, which is Proposition 2.6.1 on page 132 in [45] .
Lemma 2.3 Let X ⊆ R m 1 , Y ⊆ R m 2 be two closed convex sets. Then a pair (x * , y * ) is a saddle point of φ on X × Y if and only if sup y∈Y inf x∈X φ(x, y) = inf x∈X sup y∈Y φ(x, y) = φ(x * , y * ), and x * is an optimal solution of optimization problem
while y * is an optimal solution of optimization problem
From Lemma 2.3, we find that all saddle points of φ on X ×Y yield the same value. Moreover, the next lemma can be obtained from Lemma 2.3.
Lemma 2.4
If (x * 1 , y * 1 ) and (x * 2 , y * 2 ) are two saddle points of φ on X × Y , then (x * 1 , y * 2 ) and (x * 2 , y * 1 ) are also saddle points of φ on X × Y .
Remark 2.1 Denote byZ the set of all saddle points of function φ on X × Y ,X andȲ the optimal solution sets of optimization problems (1) and (2), respectively. Then from Lemma 2.3 it is not hard to find that ifZ is nonempty, thenX,Ȳ are nonempty, convex, andZ =X ×Ȳ .
Moreover, if X and Y are convex and compact, φ is convex-concave, thenZ is nonempty (see Proposition 2.6.9 on page 150 in [45] ).
The saddle point computation can be related to a zero-sum game. In fact, a (strategic) game is described as a triple (I, W, U ), where I is the set of all players; W = W 1 × · · · × W n , n is the number of players, W i is the set of actions available to player i; U = (u 1 · · · u n ), u i : W → R is the payoff function of player i. The game is said to be zero-sum if
for each i ∈ V and w i ∈ W i , where w * −i denotes the actions of all players other than i. The set of all Nash equilibria of a two-person zero-sum game (n = 2, u 1 + u 2 = 0) is exactly the set of all saddle points of payoff function u 2 [2] .
Sequence Lemmas
We introduce two lemmas for the following convergence analysis. The first lemma is the deterministic version of Lemma 11 on page 50 in [7] . The second one is Lemma 7 in [30] .
Lemma 2.5 Let {a k }, {b k } and {c k } be non-negative sequences with
Lemma 2.6 Let 0 < λ < 1 and {a k } be a positive sequence. If lim k→∞ a k = 0, then
Nash Equilibrium Seeking and Distributed Algorithm
In this section, we introduce a distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem and then propose a subgradient-based distributed algorithm. 
Then the network is engaged in a (generalized) zero-sum game {Ξ 1 , Ξ 2 }, X × Y, u , where Ξ 1 and Ξ 2 are viewed as two players, their respective payoff functions are u
The objective of Ξ 1 and Ξ 2 is to achieve a Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum game.
Remark 3.1 The original problem definition for the two-subnetwork zero-sum game was introduced in [40] . Notice that the Nash equilibria set of this zero-sum game is the saddle point set of U on X × Y . The Nash equilibrium seeking problem is related to many interesting problems such as the power allocation [4, 40] and saddle point computation of Lagrangian functions of constrained optimization problems [27, 24, 36] .
In the paper, we assume that the saddle point set of each objective function f i or g i on X ×Y is nonempty, which holds if X and Y are bounded. However, in this paper we does not require X and Y are bounded. Let Z * = X * × Y * ⊆ X × Y denote the set of all saddle points of U on X × Y . Notice that X * × Y * is also the set of Nash equilibria of the modified zero-sum game.
Time is slotted for k = 0, 1, . . . . Each node i ∈ V 1 holds a state x i (k) ∈ R m 1 at time k, and each node i ∈ V 2 holds a state y i (k) ∈ R m 2 at time k. In this paper, we are interested in how to achieve a Nash equilibrium.
Definition 3.1
The network Ξ is said to achieve a Nash equilibrium if, for any initial condition
The interconnection in the network Ξ is time-varying and modeled as three digraph se-
are the graphs to describe Ξ 1 and Ξ 2 , respectively, and
is the bipartite graph to describe the interconnection between Ξ 1 and Ξ 2 at time k (≥ 0). For
as the union graph with node set V and arc set k 1 ≤s<k 2 E ⊲⊳ (s),
as the union graph with node set V ℓ and arc set k 1 ≤s<k 2 E ℓ (s) for ℓ = 1, 2.
For convenience, we still use 
is bipartite without isolated nodes for k ≥ 0.
(ii) For ℓ = 1, 2, the graph sequence G ℓ is uniformly jointly strongly connected (UJSC), that is, there is an integer
To handle the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem, we propose the following subgradient-based algorithm.
Distributed Nash Equilibrium Seeking Algorithm:
where α i,k > 0, β i,k > 0 are the stepsizes at time k, a ij (k) is the time-varying weight of arc (j, i),
is the set of neighbors in V ℓ of node i at time k andk i is the last time before k when node i ∈ V ℓ has at least one neighbor in V 3−ℓ , namely
We introduce an assumption on the weights, which is also used in [32, 38, 30] .
The conditions (ii) and (iii) in A2 state that the information from agents' neighbors is used in a weighted average way. The next assumption is about subgradients of objective functions.
In fact, a bounded assumption similar to A3, which is naturally satisfied if X, Y are bounded, has been widely used (see [24, 32, 30, 29] ). Remark 3.2 Different from the algorithm given in [40] where the nodes in Ξ ℓ connect directly with those in Ξ 3−ℓ for all the time, we only require that the nodes in two subnetworks be connected at least once in each interval of length T ⊲⊳ according to A1 (i). In fact, it may be practically hard for the agents of different subnetworks to maintain communications all the time. Moreover, even if each agent in Ξ ℓ can receive the information from Ξ 3−ℓ , agents may just send or receive once during a period of length T ⊲⊳ in the aim of standing as much time as possible under a communication energy budget.
In the proposed algorithm (4), one problem is how to select the stepsizes {α i,k } and {β i,k }.
One simple case, called homogenous stepsize case, is to take a certain positive sequence {γ k } such that α i,k = β j,k = γ k for i ∈ V 1 , j ∈ V 2 and all k. We give an assumption for this sequence
is also well-known in the selection of the stepsize for distributed subgradient algorithms (e.g., [30, 31, 36] ). In many results for distributed optimization [30, 31, 34, 36] , their algorithms are of homogeneous-stepsize and mainly for weight-balanced graphs, but the stepsize in our setup is heterogenous, that is, the stepsizes may be different for different nodes, mainly to deal with general unbalanced cases.
In what follows, we start with the homogeneous stepsize case to achieve a Nash equilibrium for weight-balanced graphs (in Section 4). Then we focus on a special case to show how a homogeneous-stepsize algorithm fails to achieve our aim for weight-unbalanced graphs (in Section   5 ). Following that, we demonstrate that the heterogeneity of stepsize can help us achieve a Nash equilibrium in some cases for weight-unbalanced graphs (in Section 6).
Remark 3.3
Distributed problems under weight-unbalanced directed graphs have been studied in recent years, for example, a push-sum protocol is employed to solve the average consensus problems using non-doubly stochastic matrices in [46] , while a similar push-sum (homogeneousstepsize) algorithm is developed to eliminate the imbalance caused by the weight-unbalanced graphs for distributed optimization problems in [15] , where each node is required to know its out-degree all the time. With a different viewpoint, in our algorithm to handle unbalanced cases, we take (adaptive) heterogeneous stepsizes to achieve a Nash equilibrium.
Weight-balanced Graphs
In this section, we first present some preliminary analysis for the proposed algorithm (4) and then give the main results for the weight-balanced graphs with related convergence analysis.
A Simplified Model and Preliminary Results
Basically, the two dynamics of algorithm (4) are in the same form. Let us check the first one, that is,
By regarding the term containing y j (j ∈ V 2 ) as "disturbance", we can transform (6) to a simplified model in the following form with disturbance w i :
where
In this section, we provide some lemmas for the simplified model (7) with UJSC graphs, which are very useful to deal with the joint-connection topology for (4) in the following sections.
We first introduce a lemma about stochastic matrices [23] .
Clearly, system (7) can be rewritten as
Without loss of generality, we assume m 1 = 1 in this section for notational simplicity. (8) can be written in a compact form:
Define transition matrix
Therefore,
where λ 1 r =ᾱ r := max
The second lemma is an extension of Lemma 8 (a) in [30] dealing with weigh-balanced graph sequence to general graph sequence (may be weight-unbalanced).
The third lemma is given about the consensus within the subnetworks, which will be frequently used in the sequel. Remark 4.1 In algorithm (4), the x i dynamics and y i dynamics are coupled by the subgradient optimization terms. However, when the stepsize is vanishing, the coupling term (as disturbance) is also vanishing. In fact, Lemma 4.4 shows that the consensus can be achieved when the coupling/disturbance term is vanishing under some suitable assumptions. Therefore, the two dynamics can be viewed as two independent systems in some asymptotical sense. In fact, similar ideas have been used in many multi-agent problems including robust consensus [18] and convex intersection computation [37] .
The fourth lemma provides estimation of errors between the states of agents and their average, which plays an important role in the following convergence analysis.
Lemma 4.5 Suppose A1 (ii), A2 and A3 hold,
Remark 4.2 From the proof we find that Lemma 4.5 (ii) still holds when the non-increasing condition of {ᾱ k } and {β k } is replaced with that there exist positive integer T * and c * > 0 such
Although the above lemmas are obtained for a simplified model (7), they are, in fact, very useful in the analysis of the Nash equilibrium seeking in what follows.
Weight-balanced Graphs
In this subsection, we consider the algorithm (4) with homogeneous stepsizes (that is,
The following result, in fact, provides two sufficient conditions to achieve a Nash equilibrium under switching weight-balanced digraphs.
Theorem 4.1 Suppose A1-A4 hold and digraph G ℓ (k) is weight-balanced for k ≥ 0 and ℓ = 1, 2.
Then the multi-agent network Ξ achieves a Nash equilibrium by the algorithm (4) with the homogeneous stepsizes {γ k } if either of the following two conditions holds:
(i) U is strictly convex-concave;
(ii) X * × Y * contains an interior point.
Remark 4.3
The authors in [40] developed a continuous-time dynamical system solution to solve the Nash equilibrium seeking problem for fixed weight-balanced digraphs, and showed that the network converges to a Nash equilibrium for a differentiable strictly convex-concave sum objective function U . Theorem 4.1 is a generalization of the result in [40] in the sense that we allow time-varying communication structures and non-smooth objective function U . The same result might continue to hold for the continuous-time solution in [40] under these generalizations, but the analysis would be much more involved (cf. the treatment to a simpler problem in [41] ). Before giving the detailed proof of Theorem 4.1, we first present a useful lemma, which demonstrates the boundedness of dynamics (4).
Lemma 4.6 For algorithm (4) with
Proof: Take (x, y) ∈ X × Y . By (4) and Lemma 2.2 (ii), we have
Thus, based on (12) and A3,
From A3 again, we have
which implies
with
Because G 1 (k) is weight balanced, taking the sum for the two sides of (17) over i = 1, ..., n 1 yields to
Similarly,
Then adding (18) and (19) together leads to
Since (x * , y * ) is a saddle point of
Moreover, by Lemma 4.5,
Thus, by virtue of (20) and Lemma 2.5, lim k→∞ ξ(k, x * , y * ) is a finite number, denoted as ξ(x * , y * ). Thus, the conclusion follows.
We are in a position to prove Theorem 4.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.1: To get the conclusion, we first show that the limit points of all agents satisfy certain sum objective function equations, and then prove the Nash equilibrium convergence under either of the two conditions, (i) and (ii).
It is known that (x i (k), y j (k)), k ≥ 0 are bounded according to Lemma 4.6. Moreover, it also follows from (20) that
e iℓ (r), and then by ∞ k=0 γ 2 k < ∞ and (21) we have
The stepsize condition
As a result, there is a subsequence {k r } such that U x * ,ȳ(k r ) → U x * , y * and U x(k r ), y * → U x * , y * as r → ∞. Let (x,ỹ) be any limit pair of (x(k r ),ȳ(k r )) (noting that the finite limit pairs exist by Lemma 4.6). Because U (x * , ·), U (·, y * ) are continuous and the Nash equilibrium point (x * , y * ) is taken from X * × Y * freely, the limit pair (x,ỹ) must satisfy
We complete the proof by discussing the proposed two sufficient conditions, (i) and (ii):
(i). For the strictly convex-concave function U , we claim that X * ×Y * is a single point set. If it contains two different points (x * 1 , y * 1 ) and (x * 2 , y * 2 ) (without loss of generality, assume x * 1 = x * 2 ), then it also contains the point (x * 2 , y * 1 ) (by Lemma 2.4). Thus, for all x ∈ X, U (x * 1 , y * 1 ) ≤ U (x, y * 1 ) and U (x * 2 , y * 1 ) ≤ U (x, y * 1 ), which yields a contradiction since U (·, y * 1 ) is strictly convex and the minimizer of U (·, y * 1 ) is unique. Thus, X * × Y * contains only a single-point, denoted as (x * , y * ). Then from (23), we havex = x * ,ỹ = y * . Consequently, each limit pair of (x(k r ),ȳ(k r ))
is (x * , y * ), that is, lim r→∞x (k r ) = x * and lim r→∞ȳ (k r ) = y * . According to Lemma 4.4, lim r→∞ x i (k r ) = x * , i ∈ V 1 and lim r→∞ y j (k r ) = y * , j ∈ V 2 . Moreover, lim k→∞ ξ(k, x * , y * ) = ξ(x * , y * ) as given in Lemma 4.6, so ξ(x * , y * ) = lim r→∞ ξ(k r , x * , y * ) = 0, which in return implies lim k→∞ x i (k) = x * for i ∈ V 1 and lim k→∞ y i (k) = y * for i ∈ V 2 .
(ii). In Lemma 4.6, we have proved that lim k→∞ ξ(k, x * , y * ) = ξ(x * , y * ) for any (x * , y * ) ∈ X * × Y * . We check the existence of the two limits lim k→∞x (k) and lim k→∞ȳ (k). Let (x + , y + ) be an interior point of X * × Y * for which B(x + , ε) ⊆ X * and B(y + , ε) ⊆ Y * for some ε > 0.
Clearly, any two limit pairs (x 1 ,ỳ 1 ), (x 2 ,ỳ 2 ) of (x(k),ȳ(k)) must satisfy
Take y = y + . Then
Taking the gradient with respect to x on the two sides of (24) yields 2n
namely,x 1 =x 2 . Similarly, we can showỳ 1 =ỳ 2 . Thus, the limits, lim k→∞x (k) =x ∈ X and
We claim that (x,ỳ) ∈ X * × Y * . It follows from (18) that, for any x ∈ X,
Moreover, recalling
Then from lim k→∞x (k) =x, lim k→∞ȳ (k) =ỳ, the continuity of U and (25) we have U (x,ỳ) − U (x,ỳ) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ X. Similarly, we can show U (x, y) − U (x,ỳ) ≤ 0 for all y ∈ Y . Thus, (x,ỳ) is a saddle point of U on X × Y , which implies (x,ỳ) ∈ X * × Y * .
Thus, the proof is completed.
Homogenous Stepsize vs. Unbalanced Graph
In the last section, we showed that a Nash equilibrium can be achieved with homogeneous stepsize conditions when the graphs of two subnetworks are weight-balanced. Here we demonstrate, even in a special case, that the homogenous stepsize algorithm may not be enough to guarantee the Nash equilibrium convergence for general weight-unbalanced digraphs, unless certain conditions about the objective functions hold.
Here we consider a special case called the identical subnetwork case, which is equivalent to a distributed saddle-point computation problem, to discuss homogeneous stepsizes and the weight-balanced condition, as follows:
(⋄) Ξ 1 and Ξ 2 are completely identical:
Obviously, the considered problem under the special case (⋄) is equivalent to the following case. Consider network Ξ 1 consisting of n 1 agents with node set V 1 = {1, ..., n 1 }, the objective of this network is to seek a saddle point of sum objective function y) by a distributed way, where f i can only be known by node i. The algorithm (4) with homogeneous stepsize {γ k } will be simplified as the following distributed saddle point computation algorithm:
where (x i , y i ) is the state of node i,
Remark 5.1 Similar distributed saddle point computation algorithms have been proposed in the literature (for example, distributed saddle point computation for the Lagrange function of constraint optimization problems in [36] ). Moreover, the algorithm (26) can be viewed as a distributed version of the following centralized algorithm:
which is proposed to solve the approximate saddle point problem with a constant stepsize in [24] .
We first show that the algorithm (4) with homogeneous stepsizes (or equivalently (26)) cannot seek the desired Nash equilibrium though it is convergent, even for fixed weight-unbalanced graphs.
Proposition 5.1 Under A2-A4, suppose that f i , i = 1, ..., n 1 are strictly convex-concave and the graph is fixed with G 1 (0) strongly connected. Then, with (26) , all the agents converge to the unique saddle point, denoted as ( x, y), of an objective function
T is the Perron vector of the adjacency matrix A 1 (0) of graph G 1 (0).
Proof:
The result follows from almost the same procedure in the proof of Theorem 4.1 by re-
Although it is hard to achieve the desired Nash equilibrium with the homogeneous-stepsize algorithm in general, we can still achieve it in some cases. Here we can give a necessary and sufficient condition to achieve a Nash equilibrium for any UJSC switching digraph sequence. Proof: (Necessity) Let (x * , y * ) be the unique saddle point of strictly convex-concave function U on X × Y . Take µ = (µ 1 · · · µ n 1 ) T ∈ S + n 1 . By Lemma 2.1 again, there is a stochastic matrix A 1 such that µ T A 1 = µ T and G A 1 is strongly connected. Let G 1 = {G 1 (k)} be the graph sequence of algorithm (4) with G 1 (k) = G A 1 for k ≥ 0, and A 1 being the adjacency matrix of G 1 (k).
Clearly, {G 1 } is UJSC. On the one hand, by Proposition 5.1, all agents converge to the unique saddle point of
On the other hand, the necessity condition states that lim k→∞ x i (k) = x * and lim k→∞ y i (k) = y * for i = 1, ..., n 1 . Therefore, (x * , y * ) is the saddle point of
Because µ is taken from S + n 1 freely, we have that, for any µ ∈ S + n 1 ,
We next show by contradiction that, given any i = 1, ....,
Suppose there are i 0 andx ∈ X with f i 0 (x * , y * ) > f i 0 (x, y * ). Let µ i , i = i 0 be sufficiently small such that
, which contradicts the second inequality of (27) . Thus, f i (x * , y * ) ≤ f i (x, y * ) for all x ∈ X. Similarly, we can show from the first inequality of (27) that for each i = 1, ...., n 1 , f i (x * , y) ≤ f i (x * , y * ) for all y ∈ Y . Thus, we obtain that
or equivalently, (x * , y * ) is the saddle point of f i , i = 1, ..., n 1 on X × Y .
(Sufficiency) Let (x * , y * ) be the unique saddle point of f i , i = 1, ..., n 1 on X × Y . Similar to (17), we can show
Merging (17) and (28) gives
Since f i x * ,ȳ(k) − f i x * , y * ≤ 0 and f i x * , y * − f i x(k), y * ≤ 0 for all i, k, the second term in (29) is non-positive. By Lemma 2.5,
for a finite number ζ * , which implies that (x i (k), y i (k)) (for k ≥ 0) are bounded.
From (29), we also have
The stepsize condition ∞ k=0 γ k = ∞ implies that there is a subsequence {k r } such that
Without loss of generality, we suppose lim r→∞x (k r ) =x, lim r→∞ȳ (k r ) =ý for somex,ý (otherwise we can find a subsequence of {k r } recalling the boundedness of system states). Due to the finiteness of the number of agents and the continuity of f i , i = 1, ..., n 1 , there exists i 0 such that f i 0 x * , y * = f i 0 x * ,ý and f i 0 x, y * = f i 0 x * , y * . It follows from the strict convexityconcavity of f i 0 thatx = x * ,ý = y * .
Since the consensus is achieved within two subnetworks, x i (k r ) → x * and y i (k r ) → y * as r → ∞, which leads to ζ * = 0 based on (30) . Thus, the conclusion follows. 
Weight-unbalanced Graphs
The results in the preceding sections showed that the homogenous-stepsize algorithm may not make a weight-unbalanced network achieve its Nash equilibrium unless certain conditions (for example, the saddle points of f i , i = 1, ..., n 1 on X × Y are the same in a special case) hold.
Here we first show that the proposed algorithm with heterogeneous stepsize works for weightunbalanced graphs under the UJSC connectivity condition, and then design adaptive algorithms to update the (heterogeneous) stepsize to achieve the Nash equilibrium in two standard cases.
To show the main results, we introduce some lemmas. We first give a lemma about the limit
and (iv) are taken from Lemma 4 in [32] , while (iii) can be obtained from Lemma 2 in [32] .
Lemma 6.1 Suppose A1 (ii) and A2 (i), (ii) hold. Then for ℓ = 1, 2, we have
(ii) There is a stochastic vector φ ℓ (s) such thatΦ ℓ (s) = 1(φ ℓ (s)) T .
(iii) For every i = 1, ..., n ℓ and s, φ ℓ i (s) ≥ η (n ℓ −1)T ℓ . (iv) For every i, the entries Φ ℓ (k, s) ij , j = 1, ..., n ℓ converge to the same limit φ ℓ j (s) with a geometric rate, i.e., for every i = 1, ..., n ℓ and all s ≥ 0,
for all k ≥ s and j = 1, ..., n ℓ , where C ℓ = 2
The next lemma is about a limit for the two subnetworks. 
Proof : We will only show lim k→∞ᾱk max 1≤i≤n 1 |x i (k) − x| = 0 since the one aboutβ k can be proved similarly. At first, from lim k→∞ᾱk k−1 s=0ᾱ s = 0, we have lim k→∞ᾱk = 0. Recall (8):
where |ǫ i (k)| ≤ᾱ k L from A3. From the above equation and A2 (ii) we have max 1≤i≤n
s=0ᾱ s and then, for each k,
Taking the limit over the two sides of (31) yields the conclusion.
Then the following lemma shows a relation between the left eigenvectors of stochastic matrices and the Perron vector of the limit of their product matrix.
Lemma 6.3 Let {B k } be a sequence of stochastic matrices. Suppose B k , k ≥ 0 have a common left eigenvector µ with eigenvalue one and the associated graph sequence {G B k } is UJSC. Then,
Proof : Since µ is the common left eigenvector of B r , r ≥ s associated with eigenvalue one,
In addition, by Lemma 6.1, for each s, the
implies (µ T 1)φ(s) = µ. Thus, the conclusion follows.
Here is the main result for general graphs (may be weight-unbalanced) for the existence of a heterogeneous-stepsize design to make the network achieve a Nash equilibrium. Proof: First by Lemma 6.1 (i), (ii), the limit lim r→∞ Φ ℓ (r, k) := 1(φ ℓ (k)) T exists for each k.
We design the stepsizes α i,k and β i,k as follows:
, {γ k } satisfies the following conditions:
Let (x * , y * ) be the unique Nash equilibrium. From (17) we have
Denote Λ 1 k =diag{
Then it follows from (34) and (35) that
∀i, k and then δ * is a finite number. Therefore, by (36) we have (37) Then (37) can be written as
The subsequent proof is as follows. First, we will show that the designed stepsizes (32) can eliminate the imbalance caused by the unbalanced graphs (see the second term in (38)), then we shall prove that all the terms from the third one to the last one in (38) is summable based on the geometric rate convergence of transition matrices. Finally, we will show the desired convergence based on inequality (38) , as (20) for the weight-balance case in Theorem 4.1.
Clearly, 1(φ ℓ (s + 1)) T Λ ℓ s = 11 T , ℓ = 1, 2. From Lemma 6.1 (iv) we also have that for ℓ = 1, 2, every i = 1, ..., n ℓ and s ≥ 0, Φ ℓ (k, s) ij − φ ℓ j (s) ≤ Cρ k−s for all k ≥ s and j = 1, ..., n ℓ , where C = max{C 1 , C 2 }, 0 < ρ = max{ρ 1 , ρ 2 } < 1. Moreover, by A3, for i ∈ V 1 ,
Then based on these conclusions, multiplying 1/n ℓ 1 T on the both sides of (38) and taking the sum over ℓ = 1, 2 yield
s=r ̺ s is the sum of all terms from the third one to the last one in (39) .
We next show ∞ s=r ̺ s < ∞. Lemma 4.5 and Remark 4.2 imply
Moreover, by Lemma 6.2, we have lim s→∞ γ s ς(s) = 0, which combined with Lemma 2.6 leads to lim k→∞ k−1 s=r ρ k−s−1 γ s ς(s) = 0. From the previous conclusions we have
Then by similar procedures in the proof of Theorem 4.1 (i), we can show that there is a subsequence {k l } such that lim l→∞x (k l ) = x * , lim l→∞ȳ (k l ) = y * . Now we show lim k→∞
Moreover, by noticing that the consensus within the two subnetworks are achieved, the number l 0 can be selected sufficiently large such that for each i,
from which we have lim k→∞
Remark 6.1
The stepsize design strategy in Theorem 6.1 is motivated by the following two ideas. On one hand, agents need to eliminate the imbalance caused by the unbalanced graphs, which is done by {1/α i k }, {1/β i k }, while on the other hand, agents also need to achieve a consensus within each subnetwork and a cooperative optimization behavior, which is done by {γ k } as that in the balanced graph case.
Remark 6.2 The condition (33) can be satisfied by letting γ k = 1 k+1 for k ≥ 0. Moreover, from the proof of Theorem 6.1 we can find that, if the system states are bounded, which are naturally true if the sets X and Y are bounded, the condition (33) can be relaxed as the following condition:
Clearly, the above choice of stepsizes at time k is based on the limits of lim r→∞ Φ 1 (r, k+1) and lim r→∞ Φ 2 (r, k+1), respectively, which depend on the adjacency matrix sequences {A 1 (s)} s≥k+1
and {A 2 (k)} s≥k+1 . Therefore, it is not easy to use this approach in practical applications. In what follows, we consider how to design adaptive stepsize sequences {α i,k } and {β i,k } such that the Nash equilibrium can be achieved, where the stepsizes at time k just depend on the local information nodes can obtain before time k for some special cases.
Take
where {γ k } satisfies (33) . The only difference between stepsize selection rule (41) and (32) is that α i k and β i k are replaced withα i (k) andβ i (k), respectively. Then we consider how to design distributed adaptive algorithms forα i andβ i such that
and
Notice that (
k ) T are the Perron vectors of the limits of lim r→∞ Φ 1 (r, k+ 1) and lim r→∞ Φ 2 (r, k + 1), respectively.
The next theorem shows that, in two particular cases, we can design distributed adaptive algorithms satisfying (42) and (43) in order to ensure that network Ξ can achieve a Nash equilibrium. How to design them is given in the proof of the next theorem. Theorem 6.2 Consider algorithm (4) with stepsize selection rule (41) . Suppose A1-A4 hold, U is strictly convex-concave. For the following two cases, with the adaptive distributed algorithms satisfying (42) and (43), network Ξ can achieve a Nash equilibrium.
(i) For ℓ = 1, 2, the adjacency matrices A ℓ (k), k ≥ 0 have a common left eigenvector with eigenvalue one;
(ii) For ℓ = 1, 2, the adjacency matrices A ℓ (k), k ≥ 0 are switching periodically, that is, there exist positive integers S ℓ and two finite sets of stochastic matrices A 0 ℓ , ..., A 6.1 except that the new stepsize selection rule will yield an error term, denoted as ̟ ℓ (k, r), on the right-hand side of (37) . In fact,
where ̟ 1 s =diag
. Moreover,
s for sufficiently large s. Similarly, we have
s . Then for a sufficiently large r and any k ≥ r + 1,
where (ii). Here we design S 1 auxiliary states α (ν)i = (α 
with the initial values α Then, for each r ≥ 0, letα i (rS 1 
Note that A1 implies that the union graphs 
Then for each r ≥ 0,
. Moreover, from (46) and (47) we obtain that for
is the p-th unit vector (p-th component is one and all other components are zero). Then lim r→∞ α
Similarly, we can show that lim r→∞ β Moreover, the convergence is achieved with geometric rate. Then applying the similar idea used in showing (i) can show the conclusion (ii).
This concludes the proof and the desired conclusion follows.
Numerical Examples
In this section, we provide examples to illustrate the obtained results in both balanced and unbalanced graph cases.
Consider a network of five agents, where Take initial conditions x 1 (0) = 2, x 2 (0) = −0.5, x 3 (0) = −1.5 and y 1 (0) = 1, y 2 (0) = 0.5.
Example 7.1 The communication graph is switching periodically over the two graphs G e , G 0 given in Fig. 1, where G(2k) = G e , G(2k+1) = G o , k ≥ 0. Denote G e 1 and G e 2 by the two subgraphs Clearly, with the above adjacency matrices, the three digraphs G e 1 , G e 2 and G o 1 are weightbalanced. Let the stepsize be α i,k = β j,k = γ k for all i, j and k ≥ 0. Fig. 2 shows that the agents converge to the unique Nash equilibrium (x * , y * ) = (0.6102, 0.8844).
Example 7.2 We consider the same switching graphs given in Example 7.1 except that G e 1 is added a new arc (2, 3) , and the new graph is still denoted as G e 1 for simplicity. Here the adjacency matrices of the three digraphs G e 1 , G e 2 and G o 1 are given by In this case, G e 1 , G e 2 and G o 1 are weight-unbalanced with (α 1 2k , α 2 2k , α 3 2k ) = (0.5336, 0.1525, 0.3139), (α 1 2k+1 , α 2 2k+1 , α 3 2k+1 ) = (0.5336, 0.3408, 0.1256) and (β 1 k , β 2 k ) = (0.8889, 0.1111), ∀k ≥ 0. We design the heterogeneous stepsize as follows: 
(2k + 1) and 
Conclusions
A subgradient-based distributed algorithm was proposed to solve a distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem, which can be formulated as a zero-sum game. Sufficient conditions were provided to achieve a Nash equilibrium for switching weight-balanced digraphs under homogenous stepsizes. In the case of weight-unbalanced graphs, it was shown that the algorithm with homogeneous stepsizes may fail the algorithm to reach the Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, it was shown that there always exist heterogeneous stepsizes such that a Nash equilibrium can be achieved by our algorithm. Also, we designed respective adaptive algorithms to update the stepsizes for the Nash equilibrium seeking for two special cases. Other interesting problems, including the extension of the current idea of designing heterogeneous stepsizes to eliminate the unbalance caused by the weight-unbalanced graphs to other distributed optimization algorithms, for example, the distributed dual averaging algorithm [47] , the Newton-Raphson consensus algorithm [48] , are still under investigation.
Take j 0 = i 0 from {1, ..., n 1 }. It is not hard to show that there is a node set {j 1 , ..., j q } and time set {k 0 , ..., k q−1 , k q }, q ≤ n 1 − 2 such that (j r+1 , j r ) ∈ E 1 (k q−r ), 0 ≤ r ≤ q − 1 and (ii) We only need to show the first conclusion since the second one can be obtained in the same way. At first, we have
where the second inequality follows from A2 (iii). Let {s ir , r ≥ 0} be the set of all moments when N 2 i (s ir ) = ∅. Recalling the definition ofk i in (5),k i = s ir when s ir ≤ k < s i(r+1) . Since {β k } is non-increasing and Since y i (k) ∈ Y for all i and Y is convex,ȳ(k) ∈ Y . Then, from Lemma 2.2 (i),
Based on (52) andk i ≥ k − T ⊲⊳ + 1, we also have 
